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in 1789.
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I. Introduction
The executive and legislative branches of government have strug-
gled over control of the war powers since the adoption of the Constitu-
tion in 1789.1 However, the nation lacked any statutory procedure to
handle its "highly complex, confused use-of-force problems" until
1973.2 The War Powers Resolution of 1973,3 enacted by the Ninety-
Third Congress, was to provide a framework for the application of
shared powers.
The Ninety-Eighth Congress, in 1983, deviated from both the let-
ter and spirit of the War Powers Resolution by not requiring Presiden-
tial compliance with its provisions, and then by passing the Multina-
tional Force in Lebanon Resolution.' The alleged "compromise '5
between the executive and legislative branches, represented by the
Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, demonstrated that the
War Powers Resolution had failed to change the way the United States
engaged its military forces. The result of political maneuvering, the
Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution permitted the government
to escape all the safeguards built into the War Powers Resolution.
This note examines the War Powers Resolution, its text and back-
ground, and analyzes its application to the military situation in Leba-
1. See generally Reveley, The Power to Make War, in THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE CONDuCT OF FOREIGN PoLicY 83 (1976); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 80-125 (1972); 0. H. STEPHENS & G.J. RATHJEN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ALLOCATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 308-319
(1980); M. PUsEY, THE WAY WE Go TO WAR (1969); Note, Congress, the President,
and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1771 (1968).
2. Reveley, supra note 1, at 86.
3. War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. § 1541-1548 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as War Powers Resolution].
4. The Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Pub. L. No. 98-119, 97 Stat.
805 (1983).
5. Arguably, it was not a compromise at all. See Statutory Authorization Under
the War Powers Resolution-Lebanon: Hearing and Markup on H.J. Res. 364 and H.
Res. 315 Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1983) (statement of Congressman George Crockett).
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non during 1982 and 1983. Since that application was the first compre-
hensive test of the War Powers Resolution, it offers a unique
opportunity to evaluate the Resolution's efficacy and conclude that, in
fact, neither the concept of shared powers or the procedural require-
ments of the Resolution have been implemented.
II. The Text of the War Powers Resolution
The War Powers Resolution of 1973 culminated several years of
national debate over the Vietnam war and the relative warmaking pow-
ers of Congress and the President. Underlying the Resolution was an
intent to harness executive powers and to ensure that future military
engagements would be endorsed through the democratic process and
gain public acceptance and support.6 In adopting the War Powers Reso-
lution, Congress set forth its intent to avail itself of its constitutional
role in war-making decisions. The "Purpose and Policy" section of the
Resolution states:
It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the
framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that
the collective judgement of both the Congress and the President
will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into
hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostili-
ties is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued
use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.7
This language explicitly calls for a sharing of the power, between Con-
gress and the President, to make war. The act embraces a wide scope
of military operations and is not limited to situations of formally de-
clared war.
The war powers of the federal government are within the "zone of
6. If a majority does not acquiesce, at least, in national policy, the country
plunges into controversy, with a devastating impact on national effectiveness
at home and abroad. In this century Versailles and Vietnam are witness to the
dismal consequences of a failure to create and maintain consensus behind U.S.
initiatives abroad. The antidote for this affliction was termed bipartisanship
during the days when foreign affairs significantly divided Republicans from
Democrats. An end to the acrimony between the executive and Congress is the
more pressing concern today, followed by an articulation by both of a foreign
policy acceptable to the country at the large.
Reveley, supra note 1, at 92.
7. War Powers Resolution, at § 1541(a).
[Vol. 8
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twilight" as described by Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Company v. Sawyer.8 In the famous "Steel Seizure Case," Jus-
tice Jackson expounded the proposition that some constitutional powers
of the executive and legislative branches are meant to overlap, and that
the extent of independent authority that one branch may properly exer-
cise within this "zone of twilight" is dependent upon the degree to
which corresponding authority is exercised by the other branch.9 Jus-
tice Jackson concluded that when a President acts inconsistently with
the expressed will of Congress in an area of shared power, "[c]ourts
can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disa-
bling Congress from acting on the subject." 10
Congress expressed its claim of right to share war powers in sec-
tion 2(b) of the War Powers Resolution."1 That section bases the legiti-
macy of the Act on Congress' constitutional "necessary and proper"
powers. 2 Although not mentioned in the Resolution, the Constitution
also grants Congress the power to "declare war,"1 3 to "raise and sup-
port armies,"' 4 to "provide and maintain a navy,"1 5 to regulate the
"land and naval forces,""' and to have authority over the militia. 17 The
subject of war powers, therefore, is not one from which the courts could
"disable" Congress.' 8 The foundation established, the Resolution goes
on to construct a procedural mechanism for the exercise of shared pow-
ers. It mandates that the President "shall" consult with Congress prior
8. 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
9. Id. at 635.
10. Id. at 637.
11. War Powers Resolution, at § 1541(b) states:
Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided
that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and
proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers, but also all
other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any department or office thereof.
Id.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
13. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
14. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
16. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
17. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 15, 16.
18. The Constitution also vests the president with war powers, its "pertinent lan-
guage is rife with vague terms, frequent grants of competing authority, and outright
omissions." Reveley, supra note 1, at 90.
1984]
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to military actions, whenever possible.19 Further, it requires regular
consultation with Congress for the duration of any American military
engagement.20
The War Powers Resolution specifies a formal procedure for regu-
lar reports from the president to Congress. Absent a declaration of war,
these reports must begin within forty-eight hours of the introduction of
American forces into any one of three possible situations: into hostili-
ties or situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances; into the territory, airspace or waters of
a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments
that relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such
forces; or when sending military forces in numbers which substantially
enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already lo-
cated in a foreign nation. 21 The presidential reports must set forth cer-
tain specific information designed to increase accountability, including:
19. War Powers Resolution, at § 1542 states:
The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before
introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the cir-
cumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with
the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in
hostilities or have been removed from such situations.
Id.
20. Id.
21. War Powers Resolution, at § 1543(a) states:
In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States
Armed Forces are introduced-
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while
equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply,
replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed
Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation; The Presi-
dent shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writ-
ing, setting forth -
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United
States Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such in-
troduction took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or
involvement.
Id.
[Vol. 8
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 11
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss2/11
War Powers Resolution
the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States
Armed Forces; the constitutional and legislative authority under which
such introduction took place; and the estimated scope and duration of
the hostilities or involvement.22
The War Powers Resolution, however, does not require a presiden-
tial report submitted pursuant to the Act to specify which of the three
situations is involved. Consequently, each President who has reported
under the Act 23 has avoided citing a particular section, thereby
sidestepping the force and effect of the most important safeguard in the
Act, section 5(b).24 This section sets a time limit on any presidential
deployment of armed forces unless Congress acts to declare war, specif-
ically authorizes a longer period for deployment, or finds itself unable
to meet due to war conditions. However, this safeguard applies only
when a President reports, pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, on
one of the three types of situations dicussed above. Therefore, if the
22. Id.
23. On April 4, 1975, President Ford reported on United States participation in
efforts to transport refugees from Danang and other seaports to safer areas in Vietnam.
On April 12, 1975 President Ford reported on United States military actions to evacu-
ate Americans from Cambodia. On April 30, 1975, President Ford reported on United
States military forces' actions to evacuate Americans from Vietnam. On May 15, 1975,
President Ford reported on United States military action to recover the ship and crew
of the Mayaguez from Cambodian forces. On April 26, 1980, President Carter re-
ported on an attempt by the United States military to rescue American hostages being
held in Iran. On March 19, 1982, President Reagan reported on the involvement of
United States Forces in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai.
On August 12, 1982, President Reagan made his first report on the dispatch of United
States forces to Lebanon. Only President Ford's first report, on April 4, 1975 cited a
section of the War Powers Resolution.
24. War Powers Resolution, at § 1544(b) states:
Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be
submitted pursuant to section 1543(a)(1) of this title, whichever is earlier,
the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with
respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted),
unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authori-
zation for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by
law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of
an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be
extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President deter-
mines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military
necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the
continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a
prompt removal of such forces.
1984]
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President either fails to specify a situation type and its corresponding
section or to make a report at all, and if Congress fails to require both
a report and a section cite, the section 5(b)2" time limit will not apply.
The War Powers Resolution contains a concurrent resolution pro-
vision.2 8 Congress intended this provision to enable it to direct the re-
moval of American forces from engagement at any time, regardless of
section 5(b) time frames. The concurrent resolution puports to carry
the force of law without presidential participation. In effect, the con-
current resolution provision of the War Powers Resolution gave Con-
gress a veto power over presidential decisions to commit American
armed forces.
In the recent case of Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha,27 the United States Supreme Court held that the legislative
veto violates the constitutionally prescribed method for lawmaking; the
process must include presentment of a bill to the President.2 Although
the Chadha case involved a veto provision whereby one house of Con-
gress claimed a veto power over an executive decision, the subsequent
Supreme Court affirmance of a lower court ruling against a two-house
veto provision in United States Senate v. Federal Trade Commission29
expanded the scope of Chadha to concurrent resolutions. Thus, it has
been suggested that Congress consider the War Powers Resolution's
concurrent resolution provision unconstitutional."0 Removal of that pro-
vision, section 5(c), would not cloud the entire Resolution; the Act con-
tains a severability clause that purports to protect remaining provisions
from any decision rendering a particular section invalid. A similar sev-
erability clause involved in the Chadha case was upheld and given ef-
fect by the Supreme Court.31
25. Id.
26. War Powers Resolution, at § 1544(c) states:
Notwithstanding subsection (b) of this section, at any time that United
States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the
United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war
or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the
President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.
Id.
27. - U.S. - 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
28. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, 3.
29. - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
30. R. CELADA, EFFECT OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO PROVISION ON THE Two-
HOUSE DISAPPROVAL MECHANISM TO TERMINATE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN HOSTILITIES
PURSUANT TO UNILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL ACTION (August 24, 1983).
31. - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. at 2775.
[Vol. 8
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Although the elimination of the concurrent resolution provision
weakens the potential for congressional action, it does not dispossess
Congress of the power to directly effectuate changes in military policy.
Congress is now relegated to expressing its will through a joint resolu-
tion which, unlike a concurrent resolution, must be presented to the
president. Should a president veto such a joint resolution, the veto
would be subject to a potential congressional override. Thus, it appears
that Congress could still have the last word in a dispute with the Presi-
dent over policy.
III. The Historical Context of the War Powers Resolution
The War Powers Resolution is a historic piece of legislation. As
the Vietnam war was entering its final stages, Congress enacted the
Resolution to attempt to ensure against future catostrophic military
ventures. Congressional concern arose, in part, from an awareness that
the Vietnam experience was fueled by federal statutes providing Presi-
dents with both funds and broad discretion to carry out the war. 32 By
far the most important such statute was the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Reso-
lution3 3 which gave the President sweeping authority to conduct mili-
tary operations in Southeast Asia. The Tonkin Resolution provided
blanket Congressional consent for whatever actions the President might
take. As a practical matter, it afforded the cloak of a federal law for a
major escalation that Congress did not foresee. The Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution was repealed in 1970 when its usefulness, as an independent
source of authority for the President, had evaporated.34
Long before its repeal, the Tonkin Resolution had lost most of its
support in Congress as an appropriate federal policy. Growing numbers
of congressmen were demanding a greater role in foreign and military
affairs.35 The Senate passed the National Commitments Resolution 6 in
32. Congress supplied billions of dollars for the war effort through appropriations
bills. In addition, Congress passed legislation that provided for selective service and
sharply increased manpower limits for the armed forces. For example, the 1967 appro-
priations act proclaimed Congress' "firm intention to provide all necessary support for
members of the Armed Forces of the United States fighting in Vietnam ... " Pub. L.
No. 90-5, 81 Stat. 5 (1967).
33. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
34. The Foreign Military Sales Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-672, 84 Stat. 2053
(1970) repealed the Tonkin Resolution.
35. "Vietnam undermined the simple confidence in each of the arguments that
had traditionally supported congressional deference to the President in the area of for-
1984]
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1969. This measure defined the nature of an American military com-
mitment as one which had to recieve the approval and endorsement of
both the President and Congress. First introduced in 1967 by Senator
William Fulbright,37 the Resolution expressed the "sense of the Sen-
ate" but had no binding effect on either the president or Congress.
The Senate intended the National Commitments Resolution to be
an expression of its desire to share war powers with the President. Had
that desire been satisfied, it is unlikely that any further legislation on
the subject would have been enacted. The desire proved to be a naive
one, however, as the executive branch made no change in its policies as
a result of the non-binding Resolution. In a 1972 Foreign Relations
Committee report,38 the Resolution's failure was noted: "Following the
adoption of the National Commitments Resolution it was hoped that
the newly installed Nixon administration would take a different view
from that of its predecessor. That hope has not been realized." 9 It
became obvious to the Committee that congressional expressions with-
out the force of law would not bring about a sharing of power.40
Congress began to search in earnest for a more effective tool. The
appropriations power,41 through which Congress could either fund mili-
tary operations or terminate them, was one alternative. However, inter-
est began to focus on legislation which would deal with war powers
generically, rather than ways to control particular events and policies.
In the summer of 1970, Senator Jacob Javits42 was one of the many
outspoken advocates who introduced generic war powers proposals in
Congress.43
During the early seventies, war raged on in Southeast Asia as
American invasions and bombings of Cambodia and Laos were re-
vealed. These revelations spurred a fear that the war was widening. At
home, a critical series of domestic issues relating to the Watergate
scandal-which eventually forced President Richard Nixon from of-
eign affairs; unity, secrecy, superior expertise, superior sources of information, decision,
and dispatch." Allison, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 96 (1976).
36. S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., in 115 CONG. REC. 17,245.
37. Dem., Arkansas.
38. S. Res. 92-606, 2d Sess. (1972).
39. Id.
40. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 98th CONG. 2d Sss.,
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION (Comm. Print 1982).
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
42. Rep., New York.
43. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 40, at 48.
[Vol. 8
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fice-was becoming explosive in its own way. In this historical context,
the House of Representatives and the Senate each produced a war pow-
ers bill. The Senate, led by Senators Javits, Fulbright, and others
passed a version which adopted an "authority" test4 4 under which the
President's ability to commit forces without congressional authorization
was restricted to emergency situations. The key restraint in the Senate
bill was a thirty-day time limit which would begin to run upon deploy-
ment of the forces. Unless Congress authorized a longer deployment
within those thirty days, the forces would automatically be withdrawn.
The House favored a "performance" test4 5 under which the President
would be required to report to Congress within seventy-two hours of
deployment. The filing of the report, not the deployment, would trigger
a 120-day period for independent presidential action. The" House de-
leted any form of prior restraint upon the President; the Senate version
defined specific emergency situations and purported to limit indepen-
dent presidential power to them. A congressional conference committee
produced a compromise 4 --the War Powers Resolution of 1973 47 -that
consisted of the performance test and a maximum time period of ninety
44. Spong, The War Powers Resolution Revisited: Historic Accomplishment or
Surrender? 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 823, 832-33 (1974):
The most fundamental difference to be resolved concerned the triggering
of the 30- or 120-day period allowed for the President to obtain congres-
sional approval for his deployment of the armed forces. From the first war
powers legislation introduced by Senator Javitz, the Senate consistently
has specified the emergency situations which would permit Presidential
commitment of armed forces without particular cogressional authority.
Congressman Zablocki's brief flirtation with this so-called "authority" ap-
proach had received short shrift from his committee colleagues in the
House who favored a "performance" test. Under the House test the 120-
day period would begin to run when the President reported to Congress
within 72 hours after having deployed the armed forces, whereas under the
Senate's "authority" test the 30-day period would begin to run upon de-
ployment of the troops. The House conferees argued that an attempt to
delineate the President's warmaking powers specifically was "constitution-
ally questionable and from a practical standpoint unwise" and that lan-
guage in the Senate bill giving the President the right to forestall an attack
could license preemptive war.
Id. (footnotes omitted)
45. Id.
46. See generally Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference,
H.R. REP. No. 547, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 119 CONG. REC. 33,037
(1973).
47. War Powers Resolution, supra note 2.
1984]
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days for presidential action without Congressional concurrence.4 The
basis of the Senate's provision delineating presidential warmaking au-
thority survived, but only as an element of the bill's non-binding Pur-
pose and Policy section:
The Constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief
to introduce the United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or
into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1)
a declaration of war, (2) a national emergency created by attack
upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed
forces.4
9
The Senate overwhelmingly approved the compromise, 75-20, on Octo-
ber 10, 1973,50 and two days later, the House followed suit by a vote of
238-123.11 Senator Fulbright, expressing his satisfaction with the prod-
uct sent to President Nixon, said that the bill was a "historic recap-
ture" of Congressional powers and predicted that "[n]ever again will
the war making practices of this country be the same."52
By the time the War Powers Resolution reached President Nixon's
desk, the President's public support and credibility had nose-dived.
Only his constitutional veto power stood in the way of the bill's climb
to the status of law. Citing constitutional, institutional, and policy ob-
jections to the legislation, the President vetoed it.53 Efforts to override
the veto began immediately thereafter. The outcome was in doubt be-
cause the War Powers Resolution had not attained a two-thirds major-
ity when it was initially approved and sent to the President; additional
votes were needed for a successful override attempt. On seven previous
occasions, the President had been able to stave off an override of his
veto. 4 On this occasion, it was different. Congress was influenced by
public distress over the Vietnam war and the unfolding Watergate
48. If congressional authorization for further deployment was not forthcoming
within 60 days, the deployment had to be terminated; the president could extend the
period by another 30 days if he certified that the additional time was necessary for the
safety of American forces.
49. War Powers Resolution, at § 1541(c).
50. 119 CONG. REC. S19,006 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973).
51. 119 CONG. REC. H8963 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1973).
52. New York Times, Oct. 5, 1973, at 11.
53. Veto of War Powers Resolution, 1973 PUB. PAPERS of Richard Nixon 893
(1975).
54. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 40, at 159,160.
[Vol. 8436
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scandal. The President was not able to garner the necessary support
from the House of Representatives, which had protected five of Presi-
dent Nixon's eight previous vetoes; the House voted to override, by four
votes. 5 The Senate also voted to override, 75-18.11 The War Powers
Resolution became law in the face of presidential opposition.5 7 "It was
an overwhelming demonstration of the interests of the people who had
been aroused.""8
IV. The Passage of the Multinational Force in Lebanon
Resolution
For ten years after passage of the War Powers Resolution there
were no major confrontations over war powers.5 9 Congress resorted to
statutes which expressed its will on particular issues without invocation
of War Powers Resolution procedures.60 However, ten years of dor-
mancy had not buried the Resolution. In 1983, President Ronald Rea-
gan and the Ninety-Eighth Congress gave the Resolution its first com-
prehensive test.
A. Background
Lebanon, for thousands of years the site of violence, terrorism, and
war, served as an arena for conflicting international interests in 1982.
By the summer of 1982, Israeli armed forces had pushed the Palestine
Liberation Organization's combatants from the Israeli-Lebanese border
to the Lebanese capital of Beirut."' Hesitant to carry the battle into the
55. 119 CONG. REC. H36221 (Nov. 7, 1973).
56. 119 CONG. REC. S36198 (Nov. 7, 1973).
57. For the President's reaction to the override vote, see White House Statement
Following Action by the Congress Overriding the President's Veto (Nov. 7, 1973), in 9
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1312 (Nov. 5, 1973). For an analysis of the override vote,
see 29 CONG. QUART., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 905 (1973).
58. 129 CONG. REC. S12,986 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1983) (Statement of Senator
John Stennis).
59. See generally T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS
71-76 (1979).
60. See, e.g., Boland Amendment to the 1983 Department of Defense Appropria-
tions Act, Pub. L. No. 97-337, § 793 (1982), which prohibited certain military acvtivi-
ties in Central America.
61. Democratic Study Group, Lebanon and The War Powers Act, Special Re-
port No. 98-11 at 9 (Sept. 19, 1983).
1984]
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city, the Israelis entered into international negotiations.6 2
On July 6, 1982, President Reagan announced that he had ap-
proved a plan for United States participation in a multinational force
which would supervise the evacuation of the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization fighters from Beirut.63 According to press reports, the Presi-
dent approved the plan on July 2.64 However, he did not consult with
Congressional leaders until the day of his announcement."5 That same
day, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Clement Zablocki 6
sent a letter to the President warning of "incalculable effects on execu-
tive-legislative relations" if Reagan failed to trigger the War Powers
Resolution.67 While the President acquiesced in reporting to Congress
concerning the deployment, he rebuffed Representative Zablocki's ad-
monition by failing to specify which of the several sections of the Reso-
lution applied. In so doing, he prevented the time limitations, after
which he could not act on his own authority, from beginning to run.
The Marines completed their evacuation mission on September 10,
1982, and withdrew from Lebanese territory.68 However, during the
next week three events occurred which precipitated a Presidential order
for the Marines to return: the assassination of Lebanese President
Bashir Gemayal, a massacre of civilians by the Christian Phalangist
Militia, and the entry of Israeli forces into West Beirut.69 On Septem-
ber 29, the Marines and their fellow "peace-keepers" landed in Leba-
non once again. President Reagan issued a second report to Congress,
again failing to cite a section of the War Powers Resolution.'
Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, which triggers the
time limits for presidential action, applies to situations of "hostilities"
or "imminent involvement in hositlities."7 1 Had President Reagan clas-
sified the situation in Beirut in terms of this section, the sixty-day pe-
riod would have begun. The President's refusal to acknowledge the ap-
62. Id.
63. War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance, CSR Issue Brief No.
IB81050 at 3 (updated Sept. 15, 1983).
64. Id. at 4.
65. Id.
66. Democrat, Wisconsin.
67. War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance, supra note 63, at 4.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. War Powers Resolution, at § 1543(a).
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plicability of section 4(a)(1)2 continued even after Marines were killed
or wounded on September 30, 1982, March 15, 1983, and September 6,
1983. While the President steadfastly rejected a label of "hostilities"
for the Marine's predicament, he nevertheless coninued to increase the
might of American forces at the scene. By September 1983, the com-
bined naval and land battle group totalled over twelve thousand person-
nel and a large number of surface ships.7 On September 6, 1983, ele-
ments of the naval group fired on gun positions in the mountains
overlooking the Marine contingent. This episode marked the first use of
American naval artillery since the Vietnam war. 4
In Washington, concern over the course of events was brewing in
Congress. In early September, several leaders called on the President to
give Congress a greater role in the situation and to invoke section
4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution.7 5 However, the administration
responded that any Congressional action would hinder the executive
branch's strategy in the region, and took the position that the War
Powers Resolution was an unconstitutional interference with presiden-
tial authority.76 Despite the President's summary rejection of Congress'
contentions, representatives of the two branches met to work towards
agreement on policy. These negotiations collapsed on September 15,
1983, the President's representatives having refused to accept any
Congressionally-imposed time limit whatsoever. The administration ar-
gued that the Lebanon situation did not qualify as "hostilities" within
the meaning of the War Powers Resolution. Secretary of State George
Shultz maintained that the Marines were not engaged in hostilities, but
rather were "in a situation where there is violence. '7 8 Such statements
drew heated retorts from members of Congress." A consensus within
72. Id.
73. Democratic Study Group, The Lebanon Resolution, Fact Sheet No. 98-17 at
I (Sept. 27, 1983).
74. Id.
75. Congress Wants Greater Role On U.S. Presence in Lebanon, CONG. QUART.
1876 (Sept. 3, 1983).
76. Democratic Study Group, supra note 73, at 1.
77. Id.
78. Congress Wants Greater Role On U.S. Presence in Lebanon, supra note 75.
79."We have people up in helicopters, we're shooting rockets and artillery-if that
isn't imminent hostilities, I don't know what is," remarked Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Charles Percy (Republican, Illinois) Id. "It makes a mockery
out of law to suggest that our forces are not engaged in hostilities," concluded Senator
Gary Hart (Democrat, Colorado). Letter from Senator Hart to author (October 6,
1983).
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Congress, that "hostilities" existed as of the first Marine death, began
to take shape.80
Despite its desire to produce bipartisan support for the deploy-
ment, the administration rejected a proposal from the Democrat-con-
trolled House Foreign Affairs Committee that called for invocation of
War Powers Resolution procedures and authorized a stay of up to eigh-
teen months for the Marines in Lebanon. Senate Democrats responded
to this rejection by formally introducing a bill to declare that section
4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution and its accompanying time re-
straints applied to the situation in Lebanon. The White House immedi-
ately softened its position, re-opened negotiations with House leaders,
and reluctantly struck a "compromise" that was "virtually identical to
the resolution that was rejected by the administration a week earlier."'
The President accepted the House Foreign Affairs Committee proposal
as a bipartisan compromise. Despite his acceptance of the eighteen
month authorization, concept however, President Reagan did not re-
tract his opinion that the War Powers Resolution was unconstitutional.
In fact, he adhered to the position that neither the Lebanon Resolution
nor the War Powers Resolution could have any impact on his constitu-
tional powers as Commander-in-Chief.
B. Legislative Process
Titled the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, the com-
promise measure was introduced as a joint resolution into both houses
of Congress. From the outset, Congressional debate over the Multina-
tional Force in Lebanon Resolution was a compilation of expressions on
the Constitution, the War Powers Resolution, and current Presidential
policies in Lebanon. Within both houses of Congress there was an ap-
prehension that the proposed resolution was, as characterized on the
floor of the Senate, a "political compromise to [sic] the Leganon situa-
tion [which] instead compromises the very nature of the War Powers
Resolution. '8 2 There was a growing fear that the War Powers Resolu-
tion would be invoked in name only, without any actual limitations on
executive action: "[ilt is a compromise put together to help the admin-
80. Reid, Marines Could Spark Legal Crisis, Washington Post Sept. 20, 1983,
at A8.
81. Democratic Study Group, supra note 73.
82. 129 CONG. REC. S13,131 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983) (statement of Senator
Jim Sasser).
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istration avoid invoking the War Powers Resolution."8 3
The Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution was taken up by
the full Senate on September 27, 1983. One of the architects of the
War Powers Resolution, former Senator' Jacob Javits, submitted a
statement that expressed his view that the Multinational Force in Leb-
anon Resolution was a device beneficial to both the President and Con-
gress.8 4 Opponents of the bill were equally vocal, however.8 5 One Sena-
tor, seeing no benefit to Congress, described the measure as an
invitation for the President to "take 1,600 Marines and the Battleship
New Jersey, and call us in 1985."' 8 A number of attempts to amend
the authorization bill were made and rejected. Senator Robert Byrd 7
introduced an amendment"8 which would have invoked the War Powers
Resolution's time restraints. The Byrd amendment was tabled, 55-45.89
Senator Clairborne Pell ° presented an amendment which provided for
six months of authorization rather than eighteen.91 Senator Pell's
amendment was tabled, 62-38.92 Senator Christopher Dodd 3 and Sena-
tor Edward Kennedy" proposed an additional condition to the continu-
ation of American participation in the multinational force; their
amendment required an American withdrawal if all other contributing
nations withdrew. This amendment was accepted and incorporated into
the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution. 5 Senator Paul Tson-
gas sought to "codify the statements that ha[d] been made,"9 6 referring
83. 129 CONG. REC. S13,132 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983) (statement of Senator
Jim Sasser).
84. 129 CONG. REC. S12,991 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1983).
85. 129 CONG. REc. S13,126-13,132 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
86. 129 CONG. REC. S13,044 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983) (statement of Senator
Edward Kennedy).
87. Democrat, West Virginia.
88. Amendment No. 2231, at 129 CONG. REC. S13,041 (daily ed. Sept. 28,
1983).
89. 129 CONG. REC. S13,138 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
90. Democrat, Rhode Island.
91. Amendment No. 2228, at 129 CONG. REC. S13,139 (daily ed. Sept. 29,
1983).
92. 129 CONG. REC. S13,143 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
93. Democrat, Connecticut.
94. Democrat, Massachusetts.
95. 129 Cong. Rec. S13,145-46 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983). The Dodd-Kennedy
amendment was also incorporated into the House version of the Multinational Force in
Lebanon Resolution.
96. 129 CONG. REC. S13,147 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
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to the administration's assertions that Marine operations were confined
to the geographic boundaries of Beirut. Tsongas' amendment was ta-
bled, 56-42.97 Senator Thomas Eagleton, 98 himself an important con-
tributor to war powers legislation,9" urged his collegues to "tighten-up"
the Resolution by replacing the word "protective" with the word "de-
fensive" within the context of limits on military activities. " 'Protective'
is a more ambiguous word and susceptible to somewhat broader inter-
pretation than 'defensive'."100 Senator Eagleton's amendment, which
would have changed those words, was tabled 66-34.101
Another amendment, introduced by Senators Carl Levin and Jen-
nings Randolph, attempted to ensure that later judicial review of exec-
utive acts under the War Powers Resolution could not be avoided by
the "political question" doctrine.0 2 The fact that a case challenging
American military activities in El Salvador, Crockett v. Reagan,10 3 was
dismissed as a non-justiciable case involving a "political question" con-
cerned many Senators. In Crockett, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia held that the issue of whether American
troops were engaged in hostilities in El Salvador required resolution by
the political branches, not by the judiciary.0 According to the district
court, which was subsequently upheld on appeal, the case was "non-
justiciable because of the nature of the fact finding that would be re-
quired."10 5 The text of the proposed amendment included stipulated
facts on which a future judicial decision could be based, including a
factual finding that hostilities existed as of the first Marine death. Such
a finding would be binding on a President that signed on to it. How-
ever, the Senate defeated the effort to "eliminate any escape clause,"
97. Id.
98. Democrat, Missouri.
99. Senator Eagleton contributed to the Senate version of the War Powers Reso-
lution, but did not support the Resolution as it emerged from Conference Committee in
1973. He believed that the Committee's product amounted to a loss of, rather than a
gain in, Congressional authority.
100. 129 CONG. REC. S13,149 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
101. Id.
102. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See also Tigar, Judicial
Power, the 'Political Question Doctrine,' and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L. REV.
1135 (1970).
103. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D. D.C. 1982), aff'd. 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
See also Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D. D.C. 1983).
104. 558 F. Supp. at 888, 889.
105. 558 F. Supp. at 896.
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54-45.1°6 Rather than a finding of fact, the Multinational Force in Leb-
anon Resolution dealt with the "hostilities" issue as a Congresional
declaration, which could not bind the President.
Despite opposition on various grounds, including wide differences
of opinion on policy matters and the need for literal adherence to the
War Powers Resolution, proponents of the Multinational Force in Leb-
anon Resolution found the votes necessary to secure its passage. On
September 29, 1983, the Senate voted largely along party lines and
approved the so-called "bipartisan" measure, 54-46.1°7
In the House of Representatives, the debates did demonstrate a
higher degree of. bipartisanship than existed in the Senate. Still, many
of the arguments were the same. It was asserted that the Multinational
Force in Lebanon Resolution "maintain[ed] congressional responsibil-
ity but allow[ed] the President the latitude he must have." 10 8 The
House debates also revealed the entanglement of issues that existed in
the Senate. Expressing a preference for dealing with the policy ques-
tions, Representative Raymond McGrath 10 9 said that "[t]he issue to-
day is not really whether the President should or should not have in-
voked the War Powers Act in the first place. It is whether a majority of
the people in this House believe our commitment to Lebanon, via the
peace-keeping force, should continue or not."110
Under a semi-closed rule of procedure,' which restricted floor de-
bate, the House basically had only two alternatives to consider. The
first was the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution; the second
was a substitute offered by Representatives David Obey11 2 and Gillis
Long. 1 3 The Obey-Long substitute would have cut off funds for United
States forces in Lebanon after ninety days unless the President either
submitted to section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, or certified
that a cease-fire existed and reported on a monthly basis pursuant to
the War Powers Resolution. This alternative proposal was designed to
"provide a meaningful way for Congress to exercise a role in the deci-
106. 129 CONG. REC. S13,149 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
107. 129 CONG. REc. S13,167 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
108. 129 CONG. REC. H7568 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983) (statement of Congress-
man Reid).
109. Republican, New York.
110. 129 CONG. REc. H7619 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983).
111. H.R. Res. 318 (129 CONG. REC. H7560, daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983) limited
debate; Representative Levitas labeled the limitations a "gag rule" (at H7561).
112. Democrat, Wisconsin.
113. Democrat, Louisiana.
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sion to leave Marines in Lebanon as events change ... . The Obey-
Long substitute was defeated, however, 272-158.115
With the substitute eliminated, the House turned its attention to a
block of amendments offered by Chairman Zablocki. 118 These amend-
ments, which were accepted by the House acting as a Committee of the
Whole and incorporated into the Multinational Force in Lebanon Reso-
lution, 17 changed the requirement for Presidential reports under the
Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution from at least once every six
months (which would have been consistent with War Powers Resolu-
tion reporting requirements) 1 8 to at least once every sixty days.119
These amendements also noted specific areas to be covered by such re-
ports, and expressed Congressional policy concerns over such matters
as a partition of Lebanon. 20
As Representative William Lehman121 had noted before the de-
bates had begun, "[w]hen the President and the House leadership get
together on something, they usually get what they want. 122 The only
order of business remaining was a vote on the Multinational Force in
Lebanon Resolution as amended. As predicted, the joint resolution
passed, 270-161.123
The next day, September 29, the resolution passed by the Senate
was reported to the House. The significant difference between the Sen-
ate and House versions was the difference in reporting requirements;
the House bill required a report at least every sixty days, 24 whereas
the Senate bill required a report at least every ninety days.125 Chair-
man Zablocki told the House that the President had voluntarily agreed
to a sixty-day requirement, 126 and that there was "no further need for
114. 129 CONG. REc. H7582 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983).
115. 129 CONG. REc. H7617 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983).
116. Democrat, Wisconsin.
117. 129 CONG. REC. H7622 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983).
118. War Powers Resolution, at § 1543.
119. The Senate's version, as debated and passed, specified a 90 day reporting
requirement.
120. These items were eventually deleted from the bill; the House later adopted
the Senate version, which did not contain specified areas to be reported or on policy
opposition to a partition of Lebanon. See infra text accompanying notes 124-29.
121. Democrat, Florida.
122. Interview with Representative William Lehman, in Miami (Sept. 21, 1983).
123. 129 CONG. REC. H7623 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983).
124. H.R.J. REs. 159, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
125. S.J. REs. 364, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
126. 129 CONG. REc. H7725 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
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discussion or delay."12 The House promptly voted to accept the Senate
version, 253-156,128 to lay aside the previously approved House version,
and to send the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution to the Pres-
ident.1 29 The net effect of the bill's language was to provide statutory
authorization for continued deployment, pursuant to the War Powers
Resolution, without addressing the failure of both Congress and the
President to realize the aspirations of the Resolution.
President Reagan signed the statute into law on October 12, 1983,
and in an accompanying statement 3 emphasized the "bipartisan ba-
sis" upon which foreign policy should be conducted. 31 As expected, the
President expressed "reservations about some of the specific Congres-
sional expressions ' ' 132 in the Resolution. The President's statement
characterized the automatic termination provision of the War Powers
Resolution as an "arbitrary and inflexible"1 33 deadline that imporperly
restricts presidential authority. President Reagan argued that "isolated
and infrequent" 134 attacks upon American forces did not constitute
hostilities which would invoke the "unwise" 13 5 timetable of the War
Powers Resolution.
Most significantly, the statement expressed the President's convic-
tion that despite his signing the Multinational Force in Lebanon Reso-
lution into law, he could not be bound by it:
I believe it is, therefore, important for me to state in signing this
Resolution, that I do not and cannot cede any of the authority
vested in me under the Constitution as President and Commander-
in-Chief of United States Armed Forces. Nor should my signing be
viewed as any acknowledgement that the President's constitutional
authority can be impermissibly infringed by statute, that congres-
sional authorizations would be required if and when the period
specified in section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution might be
deemed to have been triggered and the period had expired, or that
section 6 of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution may be
127. Id.
128. 129 CONG. REC. H7726 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
129. Id.
130. Statement of the President, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. No. 41 (Oct.
12, 1983).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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interpreted to revise the President's constitutional authority to de-
ploy United States Armed Forces.138
The President signed the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolu-
tion to gain a minimum of eighteen months of congressional blessing
for his policies. It was the President's position that the statute in no
way put a maximum time limit on deployment because no statute could
diminish his independent authority over war powers.
V. Conclusion: The Continuing Need For Accountability
The saga of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution high-
lights a need for the nation to once again focus on the process by which
it becomes engaged militarily. Lives of American soldiers were at
stake, yet neither the legislative nor executive branch of the federal
government was willing to stand firm and abide by the provisions of the
War Powers Resolution. Just ten years after its passage, the purpose of
the War Powers Resolution has been substantially undermined. Al-
though just a few months have elapsed since the Multinational Force in
Lebanon Resolution became law, it is not premature to conclude that
the effect of this measure was essentially to restore the pre-War Powers
Resolution status quo in the form of unchecked presidential discretion.
Have the wounds from the Vietnam experience healed so completely
that the nation has forgotten, and failed to learn from them?187 In the
days since the Lebanon Resolution's enactment, more than 240 Ameri-
cans have lost their lives in Lebanon, and hostilities continue.
Since the inception of American troop deployment in Lebanon,
President Reagan chose not to comply with the procedural regulations
and safeguards built into the War Powers Resolution. Before he acqui-
esced in the compromise which evolved into the Multinational Force in
Lebanon Resolution, the President chose not to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the War Powers Resolution in court as a means of forestall-
ing and/or terminating Congressional demands for a role in military
136. Id.
137. See generally Reveley, Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Preroga-
tive or Usurpation? 55 VA. L. REV. 1243 (1969); Wormuth, The Vietnam War: The
President versus the Constitution, in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
711 (R. Falk ed. 1969); Buchan, Questions About Vietnam, in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (R. Falk ed. 1969); Van Alstyne, Congress, the Presi-
dent, and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(1972).
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policy.138 That alternative had little political appeal and presented the
potential for an enormous erosion of executive power; a ruling adverse
to the President's position would inspire more frequent and more effec-
tive congressional action.
The course of action clearly anticipated by the War Powers Reso-
lution would have been for President Reagan to admit the existence of
hostilities in Lebanon as of September of 1982, and to seek congres-
sional authorization for continued deployment. Had the President taken
this step he would have abided by and upheld the law, and realized the
sharing of responsibility that was the intent behind the War Powers
Resolution; further, he would have been in a favorable position to build
truly bipartisan support for his policies both within Congress and
amongst the people. Instead, President Reagan apparently ignored the
letter and spirit of the War Powers Resolution for as long as he could.
When American casualties in Lebanon forced the issue to the forefront,
the President resorted to semantics and arguably attempted to sidestep
the law. In the process, he demonstrated that the United States can
still become involved in a military conflict without due regard for its
own law.
Perhaps Congress is culpable for permitting President Reagan to
evade the War Powers Resolution. For more than a year, Congress sat
idle as American soldiers dug in between warring factions. Congress
failed to require the President to submit to section 4(a)(1) of the War
Powers Resolution, and the sharing of responsibility did not take place.
Congressional abstinence from its lawful role revealed its ignorance of
the fact that "once our troops are committed to a hostile situation, it is
almost impossible to pull them out." 139 In September of 1983, deaths
138. "[The President] and his aides have produced no legal brief or other docu-
ment justifying their refusal to comply with the [War Powers Resolution]. And the
reason is simple: They have none. There is talk in the newspapers, for example, that the
Congress is demanding something that is 'unconstitutional'; but we have seen no Opin-
ion of the Attorney General reaching that conclusion." Lewis, _ N.Y. Times, Sept.
19, 1983 at A-19.
139. 129 CONG. REc. H7582 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983) (statement of Represen-
tative Luken). Accord Henkin, A More Effective System for Foreign Relations: The
Constitutional Framework, 66 VA. L. REV. 751, 766 (1975):
[O]nce we are at war, Congressional control-which in my view Congress
continues to have-becomes largely hypothetical. In Indochina, Congress
had constitutional authority, by resolution or through the appropriation
process, to terminate, confine, or otherwise limit our participation. But a
large majority of Congress felt it could not break with the President with-
out jeopardizing the lives of American troops and other national interests.
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and injuries to American troops partially awoke Congress from its
hibernation. As Senator Lawton Chiles 140 remarked, "[f]ive of our
boys had already died by the time Congress got around to consider
invocation of the War Powers Act. '141
Under pressure of public concern for the Marines and the possib-
lity of war, Congress did pass legislation under the War Powers Reso-
lution. That legislation-the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolu-
tion--does little more than "rubber stamp"'142 the President's policies.
The objective of the War Powers Resolution, according to the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, was to "allow the President and Congress
to work together in mutual respect towards their ultimate, shared goal
of maintaining the peace and security of the nation."' 43 Neither the
objective of the War Powers Resolution, nor the "ultimate goals" in-
volved were achieved by the Multinational Force in Lebanon
Resolution.
The Lebanon experience sets a dangerous precedent for the future.
The President and Congress have failed to demonstrate an understand-
ing that "loophole-making is not in [their] own, nor in the country's
best interest.' 44 With the judiciary an unlikely participant in the reso-
lution of war powers issues,145 concurrent irresponsibility on the part of
the executive and legislative branches upsets the treasured American
notion that the United States is a "nation of laws, not men."' 146
The Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, and the national
policies that it represents, have rekindled public concern over "presi-
dential credibility and integrity, [over] congressional gullibility, and
[over] the effectiveness of our foreign policy system.' 1 47 The experi-
ence, and the possible renewal of attention to the process through
which war powers are implemented, may bring about refinements in
In a word, the constitutional restraints on the President existed but were
not effective.
Id.
140. Democrat, Florida.
141. Letter from U.S. Senator Lawton Chiles to author (Nov. 29, 1983).
142. Id.
143. H.R. REP. No. 93-287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1983).
144. FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 56, at 75.
145. War powers are "so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of gov-
ernment as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference." Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952).
146. Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 292 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
147. Henkin, supra note 135, at 761.
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the process and an increased awareness both within the government
and the public. In the future, both the President and Congress must
overcome the tendency to confuse a military policy with the lawful pro-
cedure to implement that policy. The procedure, the War Powers Reso-
lution, requires democratic control over questions of war and peace.
"Democratic control involves decisions made by all the federal repre-
sentatives of the people-the president, the Senate, and the House--on
a timely and informed basis."1 48 Both the President and Congress must
abide by the War Powers Resolution, or change it through the legisla-
tive process. This note makes no suggestion for changes in the statute,
because absent a commitment to the principles of shared power and
responsibility, a change of language will not compel either the Presi-
dent or Congress to be faithful to the ideal. Only an informed public, a
citizenry that keeps watch over the process by which its country enters
into international hostilities, can require adherence to the law and to
democratic principles on the part of their elected representatives.
Paul D. Novack
148. Reveley, supra note 1, at 93.
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